Government regulations come always after big crises. Are bankers next to split following the auditors? by Pelagidis, Theodore & Moutafidis, Yanni
European Research Studies,  
Volume XV, Issue (3), 2012 
 
 
Government Regulations Come Always after Big Crises. 
Are Bankers Next to Split Following the Auditors? 
 
Theodore Pelagidis1, Yanni Moutafidis2 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
When things are good nobody asks why. When things are too good to be true, only a 
few realise that it is true. When things finally turn bad everybody finds out that the emperor 
has no clothes on. Then, promising politicians take over the crisis to save the world. Is this 
process just human nature where the system works always in favour of the ruling class, or 
well-educated humans is a must for a true democracy? In any case, society would be better-
off when informed, rather than ignorant.  
In this short note, we offer an explanation for the current persisting mediocre 
growth rate mainly in the US. At the centre of our analysis and explanation for the above 
matter lie the persisting structural distortions found in the US banking industry.. We focus on 
the investment banking system in particular as we are considering it as the absolutely 
principal factor that circulates and allocates capital in the globe. We show why and how this 
system malfunctions, we focus on the conflicts of interest and we finally offer both an 
explanation and a way out of the current Wall Street institutional distortions, which we 
consider of critical importance for bringing back the US as well as the western economy as a 
whole, back on track.  
In addition, our view also offers an indirect explanation about the inability of the 
Western economies to succeed high growth rates, reducing government debt and 
unemployment at the same time. It is in fact the inability to substantially reform the banking 
system, leaving it substantially operating as before, that drags down the economy to 
inadequate growth rates, despite repetitive programs of Quantitative Easing (QE) by the 
FED in the US or “backdoor QE” in Europe.  
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1. Crisis Part I: Auditors Split from “Creative Accounting” Consultants 
by Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US 
 
During the formation of the dotcom bubble in the 90’s, when everybody was 
profiting, the Auditors couldn’t be left behind. So, being “creative”, they came up 
with the idea to offer accounting consultancy to clients they were promptly due to 
audit afterwards, tripling their revenues in the process. Consequently, everybody 
was looking successful. The auditors had more revenues, the corporations were 
showing more profits, the Investment Banks and other professionals in the financial 
industry had more business, and investors’ portfolios were inflating along with the 
stock market bubble. All in all, the “paper economy” seemed to be performing well 
and the politicians’ leadership looked very effective.  
During the bear market 2000-2002, when everybody found out that the 
emperor has no clothes on, the bubble deflated and the domino effect worked again 
in the real economy. Corporate scandals in “blue chip” companies like Enron and 
WorldCom could not be hidden or “cooked” any longer. Then, while previously 
successful looking professionals began blaming each-other for all the painful 
consequences affecting the lives and fortunes of many people, promising 
government officials intervened again to punish the criminals and save the 
unprotected public from the “crooks”. Market regulations were once again the 
prescribed medication. As a result of this mini crisis, the oldest jewel of the Auditing 
Industry, (Arthur Andersen), became the martyr, as it was essentially forced into 
liquidation in 2002. Shortly afterwards, the rest of the industry sold-off their 
consultancy business, in compliance to one of the key directives of the “Sarbanes-
Oxley Act” that separates the conflicting business of Consulting from that of 
Auditing.  
 
 
2.  Why Regulators Act Always After a Big Crisis but Never Before? 
 
Were the above conflicting services offered from the Auditors until recently 
the only ones offered in the financial marketplace? Are there any other major 
conflicting services offered today by the main participants in the financial markets? 
What about the services offered by the Banks in the Buying and Selling process of 
financial products with respect to the public interest? Are there perhaps obvious 
conflicting interests between departments within Banks waiting to be painfully 
discovered again by the public, and to be followed once again by regulatory 
interventions after the next big crisis in the global financial system? Is there really 
any so called “Chinese Wall” between the departments of an organisation, or is it 
just a public attraction, like the “Wall” in modern China today which is part of the 
interrelated World Trade Organisation? And if these concerns are valid, why are 
legislators again waiting for the crisis to appear first, before taking any action? 
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As history teaches and helps us to predict the future, a reasonable person 
should wonder why elected government officials act always after a crisis but never 
before. A person well educated in history has only to recall and attempt to justify the 
timing of the following major regulatory interventions in the financial industry 
(coincidentally always after disasters) during the last century: Why was a new 
oversight body, the Securities and Exchange Commission, created in 1934 following 
the biggest crash to date in the Dow Jones index (-90%) from its peak in 1929, 
accompanied with the largest number of rules and regulations governing all financial 
markets in the USA? (Bernanke 2004, Ahamed 2009). Why was the Banking 
industry separated by the Glass-Steagall act into Commercial Banking (accepts 
deposits) and Investment Banking (underwrites securities) in 1933, in order to 
reduce conflicts of interests and restore confidence in the banking system following 
the crash in the Dow Jones (-90%) and the USA depression in the 30s? 
Why was the daily computerised program trading in the NYSE regulated 
just after the one day mini crash in the Dow Jones (-22%) on the 19th of October 
1987? Why was the auditing industry forced by the “Sarbanes-Oxley Act” of 2002 
to spin off its “creative accounting” consultancy services after the discovery of 
corporate scandals in the USA, causing serious damages to employees, investors and 
to the broader public in general? Why did the Chairman of the US Congress’ 
Banking Committee, Senator Paul Sarbanes, ironically, introduced the “Sarbanes-
Oxley Act” in 2002 to regulate public corporate governance and audited reporting, 
after the burst of the dotcom bubble of the 90’s that revealed the corporate scandals 
of Enron and WorldCom and not before, when in a family gathering in the mid 90’s 
he told me that the financial markets where “adequately regulated”? Why was he not 
aware of the dual and conflicting services of auditing and the same time “creative 
accounting” consulting offered to the same clients from the Auditing companies 
during the 90s? Why did the Attorney General and candidate Governor of New York 
at that time Eliot Spitzer punish most Wall Street brokerage firms by imposing fines 
for illegal practices in 2003 after the burst of the dotcom bubble of the 90s, when 
competing to get investment banking business broke down the “Chinese Wall” that 
was created after the 1929 stock market crash to separate Investment Banking from 
Research and Asset Management? (Kaiser 2009). 
Well, the most popular government official to investors, and the biggest 
enemy as well as friend of the financial services companies today in the USA was at 
that time, the former Attorney General and ex-Governor of New York, Eliot Spitzer. 
His decision to run for Governor of New York State was an example that probably 
helps us to answer all of the above questions. Maybe, he had the need to become 
popular to voters/investors that lost money following the burst of the dotcom bubble, 
by becoming an apparent enemy to the financial services companies he punished 
But, in fact also their friend, considering that he just scratched the surface of the 
conflicting interests issue regarding the services offered by them today. Otherwise, 
someone should naturally wonder why no previous Attorney Generals or other 
elected officials didn’t fulfil the job for which they had been elected before any 
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crises, or why previous government oversight bodies were not sufficiently well 
informed to act pre-emptively during the formation of the crises, by introducing the 
Glass-Steagall or the Sarbanes-Oxley Acts earlier? 
We don’t know why. We don’t know why regulators act always after a big 
crisis but never before. One thing we all know is that the financial industry was the 
biggest campaign financing contributor to both parties in the USA, especially before 
the abolition of the Glass-Steagall Act, ironically, at the peak of the dotcom bubble 
in 1999. 
In the market economy of a “Democracy with equal opportunities”, the 
public/voters expect from governments to structure an efficient and competitive 
market place in order to allow the “invisible hand” to function effectively and fairly 
for all participants. Thus, either the legislators didn’t foresee the above mentioned 
crises during their formation, and as such were not competent enough, or they did 
see them coming but chose to look the other way for reasons which I can only 
suspect. What is certain in business, however, is that any expense in the corporate 
world has to be justified to the shareholders. Therefore, any corporate contribution 
to campaign financing has to be reimbursed in some form, some day, from the 
recipient.  
 
 
3.  Today, “Chinese Wall” Attracts Rather Than Splits the Public to Sell 
and Buy Side 
 
Today, there is an obvious question arising from the government legislation 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; why didn’t regulators stick the knife all the way down to 
the bone of the financial industry, to also eliminate the conflicting interests between 
services offered by the Banks to the public? Either they didn’t notice any conflicting 
practices in the trading process on the part of the banks, or they are aware of them 
but have a reason to wait for the next big crisis before acting again. More 
specifically, why the US Congress, led by the banking committee headed by Senator 
Paul Sarbanes, didn’t examine the overall transparency, competitiveness and 
fairness in the market place in order to reinforce it by their act? Did they really 
examine the selling and buying process and the participants’ role in the evaluation 
and trading of these “blue chip” companies like Enron and WorldCom at those 
exuberant prices just before their bankruptcy? In the same line of thought, why did 
former Attorney General Spitzer limited the investigation behind the “Chinese Wall” 
to the Analysts level, and did not proceed all the way down to the Asset 
Management level (buy side), which we assume should also be separated by this 
famous “Wall” due to the conflicting interest it has with the Investment Banking 
division (sell side)? Is it not obvious that the Asset Management division (buy side) 
is in direct conflict with the Investment Banking division (sell side) of a Bank, both 
services being offered to the public from the Banks today?  
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Finally, should we wait, after the big financial crisis of 2008, for a double-
dip to come and crash like a bomb in the hands of President Obama before future 
political candidates/legislators intervene to bring into equilibrium the sophistication 
and competitiveness existing only in the SELL side today, into the BUY side as 
well, allowing the markets to function efficiently through a competitive price system 
by reaching fair prices and being immune to periodic “irrational exuberances”? 
(Rajan 2011). 
As we know, the more sophisticated and competitive the demand and supply 
sides are in any marketplace, the fairer the prices will be. This is not an advanced 
economic theory candidate for a Nobel Prize. This is simply elementary level 
textbook theory of “supply and demand”, taught in first year economics. Why are 
economists/regulators unable to see this and resolve it today? Why can’t they 
identify the sophistication and the means available to the supply side that tries to sell 
at the highest possible price and profits mainly when markets go up (Bull Markets), 
vis-à-vis the demand side that should try to buy at the lowest possible price and also 
profit when markets go up, but which suffers the risk too when markets go down 
(Bear Markets)? The supply or sell side of the financial market, composed of Banks 
(Investment and Commercial today), Mutual Fund companies, stock exchanges, 
financial media (newspapers, magazines, TV, radio, etc), indexing companies, rating 
companies, research and data providers to the market, and many other professions 
profiting from rising markets, are all pitched against the demand or buy side. 
However, the buy side is largely composed of the majority of unsophisticated 
investors specialised in their own line of business but not in investing, the 
“professional money managers” that “belong” to the supply side institutions anyway 
and whose sole motivation is the generation of fees on sales transactions and assets 
under management, the Pension Funds that do not dare to deviate from their 
benchmarks, and only recently selected real Hedge Funds; a very small but rapidly 
growing group of extremely sophisticated professionals, investing alongside with 
their investors/clients and motivated by the profits generated from the capital under 
management. Unfortunately, trading prices and the overall valuation of the markets 
are determined by the participants from the demand side and their willingness to buy 
a financial asset at a specific price. If the sophisticated supply side can convince part 
of the demand side that Enron, Amazon.com or Microsoft, for example are 
undervalued trading at 100 times their P/E ratio (perhaps calculated by the recently 
discovered “creative accounting” techniques), the transaction will take place 
whether the market is at a bubble level or not. The average unsophisticated investor 
who bought either from the broker who makes a living selling stocks, or via a 
Mutual/Pension Fund whose manager is obliged to be invested at all times following 
the mandatory benchmark, or through a tailored-made portfolio managed by a 
private banker who is no better than the mutual fund managers of the same Bank, or 
via an index fund whose computer/manager simply follows the index, is the majority 
of the demand side and will passively find out in the future whether the market was 
over or under valued. Only investors who invest via selected real Hedge Funds, 
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alongside proven successful hedge fund managers, can be objectively considered to 
be part of the minuscule (less than 3% today) sophisticated demand side that would 
probably sell short (i.e., a bet that the price will fall) the above mentioned shares, 
should they have realised that the market or the specific shares were overvalued. We 
should all keep in mind that it was Hedge Fund short-sellers who first identified 
financial juggling at Enron and other companies, and who cried “wolf” to US 
regulators. 
 
 
4.  Whatever Shines Is Not a Hedge Fund 
 
Over the last twenty to thirty years this growing but still tiny portion of the 
demand side, which used to be called “smart money”, has been successfully 
investing only through hedge funds. This indisputable investment success is clearly 
shown in black and white audited profit numbers, and not in well designed 
marketing brochures, TV commercials, “unbiased” articles in popular financial 
newspapers or other promotional means employed by the “traditional” asset 
management services, offered by all sell side financial institutions today. Of 
particular importance is the continued success of this unbiased investment approach 
during the bear market years from 2000 to 2002. Understandingly, the result has 
been the recent geometric growth of assets under management in hedge funds 
worldwide, from US$ 400 billion in 2000 to US$ 2 trillion today. This is the reason 
why Banks and other sales oriented financial institutions have again recently 
adapted to their clients’ investment maturity levels, by including some packages of 
hedge funds in their range of investment products available for sale to them. In the 
course of time, we can observe that the offered investment products by the Banks 
have improved profitability for the clients/investors along with their improved 
maturity in investing. From the un-audited discretionary accounts or brokerage 
advice in the 70s and ‘80s, the investment products offered by the Banks have 
improved to the audited but with negative Alpha (less than the markets’ Beta) 
returns of the traditional Mutual Funds, followed by the Index Funds in the 90s 
which generate small profit margins left for the Banks and, finally, to Alternative 
Investment products in the 2000s. However, the results of such Alternative 
Investment packages offered by the Banks today in relation to the authentic hedge 
funds industry’s performance by category have been very mediocre so far due to the 
alternative managers’ selection process by inexperienced Bankers/Brokers in 
performance oriented investment vehicles. In addition, this selection process 
includes again conflicts of interest arising from the kickbacks or “soft dollars” 
generated via trading commissions offered by average managers to the transaction 
fees oriented nature of the Bankers/Brokers, coupled with a growing number of 
“Speculative Funds” misleadingly attaching to themselves the fashionable label, 
“Hedge Fund”. In other words, whatever shines in the Alternative Investment 
packages offered by the Banks or other vendors today are not necessarily Hedge 
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Funds. The notorious bankruptcies from the “Long-Term Capital Management” in 
1998 headed by shiny Nobel Prize winners in economics to the “Amaranth 
Advisors” recently, clearly demonstrates examples of speculative funds calling 
themselves “Hedge Funds” in order to capitalise on their long term proven success 
for marketing purposes. As we all know, the main investors of these speculative and 
overleveraged funds were clients of financial institutions such as Morgan Stanley, 
Goldman Sachs, Credit Swiss, MAN Group and other. 
Consequently, day by day an increasing number of investors realise that the 
poor performance of their portfolios is due to the existing conflicts of interests 
between the asset management division (which should buy optimally for them) and 
the investment banking division (which should sell indiscriminately to any buyer, 
including them, any financial product), both housed within the same organization or 
with its subsidiaries. Well, we argue that the more investors realise these conflicts in 
relation to their interests and wake-up by shifting their capital to asset management 
companies belonging to the buy side only, the quicker will the demand side make its 
sophisticated presence felt in the market place, and hence the sooner will markets 
trade efficiently at fairer valuations. But how long will it take for this shift of 
investors capital from sell side to buy side investment companies to bring about 
equilibrium in the markets, and how many more bubbles and bursts are investors 
likely to suffer in the process? (Fleckenstein(2008) 
We strongly believe that either the investors will continue to learn by 
experiencing poor performances and the financial industry will continue adapting 
the offered products to their learning curve, or government regulations following a 
second, “double dip” big crisis in the financial system worldwide will eventually 
bring about the desired equilibrium and, therefore, competitiveness in the 
marketplace. Whichever comes first or a combination of both. Unfortunately, our 
predictions are not so optimistic for the broader public which we think will continue 
to suffer again and again, as always in history. The politicians/legislators need to 
take advantage of the current big crisis in order to act by law for the separation of 
the “one-stop financial shop” banks, servicing clients from the buy as well as the sell 
side of the market today, into two independent professions with competing services 
and interests within the financial industry (Lewis 2010, 2011). On the one hand the 
sell side institutions composed of the investment banks acting as advisers, 
underwriters, etc. for their corporate clients, and on the other hand the buy side 
professional entities made up of the Asset Management Companies acting on behalf 
of the investors. Unfortunately for the public again, as always, the conservative 
politicians’ argument is: “If not broke try not to fix it”. But, why does “preventative 
medicine” have a proven value in the health industry but not in the financial 
industry? And after all, why have legislators separated the pharmacists from the 
medical doctors in the health industry?  
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5.  Big Banks Abandon the “One-Stop Financial Shop” and Split from 
Asset Management 
 
There are already signs of radical “business” and legal restructuring, silently 
and smoothly taking place, among the largest leading multinational Banks which 
have lately adopted the “one-stop financial shop” strategy to service all their clients. 
Giant banks have quietly given up their recently adopted “financial supermarket” 
strategy by selling off, exchanging or legally disassociating their Asset Management 
business from their core banking and broker-dealer entities operations, especially 
after the burst of the bubble in 2008. But even by the end of 2005 and during 2006, 
CitiGroup had exchanged its Asset Management business with Legg Mason’s 
broker-dealer business and acquired a significant equity interest in the company, 
UBS had sold its private banks & GAM unit to its 21% subsidiary of the enlarged 
Julius Bear and Merrill Lynch had “sold” its Asset Management unit (which 
includes its mutual funds family) to BlackRock, its 50% subsidiary today. 
But what happened suddenly to the Bankers’ highly expensive campaign 
financing contributions to both parties in the USA, fighting for the abolition of the 
Glass-Steagall Act since its inception in 1933 that finally came in 1999, allowing 
them at last to apply their main “financial supermarket” strategy in the Banking 
industry? Is the recent business separation of the asset managers from the broker-
dealers (the Buyers from the Sellers) in the Banking industry just as a coincidence 
following the “Sarbanes-Oxley Act” and the imposed fines to most Wall Street 
brokerage firms for illegal practices in 2003 after the burst of the dotcom bubble of 
the 90s, or were these “amicable business divorces” more of a prudent and quiet “off 
the record” suggestion from the legislators/regulators to their big campaign 
financing contributors in order to prepare them for the coming regulatory 
separation?  
Such precautionary action from the big players in Banking, clearly 
demonstrates the sense of inevitability they feel with regard to a regulatory or 
market-forced separation of the buy from the sell side in the financial industry, 
sooner rather than later. These leading multinational Banks have, perhaps, taken 
their lesson from the recent regulatory intervention which separated the conflicting 
services offered by the Auditing Industry. No big Bank can afford to be the Arthur 
Andersen martyr of the Banking Industry without any opportunity to legally defend 
its professional practices. Maybe, this is the reason why we are observing the start of 
a trend in the Banking Industry to separate, purely from a legal stand point so far, 
the buying from the selling services entities, before regulators force them to do so in 
a hurried and disadvantageous for them manner. The Bankers are smart enough to 
prepare a smooth, but in reality, only a legal “spin-off” of their buying or selling 
activity, before they are obliged to do so by law collectively after the next big 
financial crisis, in a similar fashion to what the Auditing Industry had to go through 
(Acharya and Richardson (2009)). 
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So, should legislators wait for the next big financial failure, similar to the 
case of 2008 “Lehman Crisis” or of Long Term Capital which may not be as wisely 
handled by the presiding government officials at the time, or should they act pre-
emptively today by eliminating inefficiencies in financial markets before a crisis 
explodes? (Rogoff and Reinhart 2009). It is a matter of time when the globally 
interrelated banking system will experience an important failure followed by a big 
crisis which could, for example, come from the mishandling of a large and 
miscalculated major trade in derivatives which are also considered as “a time bomb” 
in the financial system from successful professional investors like Warren Buffet. It 
is reminded that it is the derivative market that has substantially paralysed the 
Eurozone’s banking system and has mainly provoked the severe turbulences that the 
EU member-states are currently experiencing. 
And finally, should the broad public continue to manage its financial affairs 
in the same way it purchases consumer goods, influenced by the marketing and 
selling techniques used by the sellers side of the financial industry today, or is it 
time for the investors to be assisted by powerful and independent professional 
entities from the buyers side, acting on their interests and being remunerated only by 
them? Is it also time for the broader public to become better informed and educated 
in handling its financial matters in today’s demanding lifestyle, by including a basic 
finance course in our elementary education similar to mathematics or composition, 
as the current Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke has also suggested? 
We believe that the sooner governments act to establish the power of a 
sophisticated, competitive and efficient framework in the marketplace by law, which 
will separate and reinforce the competing interests between the BUY and SELL 
side, the better it will be for our society which otherwise risks to realise again and 
again that the emperor has no clothes on.  
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